

Virtualized In-Cloud Security Services for Mobile Devices

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- Motivation
 - Malware detection: high security, low resources
- Architecture
 - Antivirus as an off-device network service
- Implementation and Evaluation
 - Resource requirements
 - Power consumption
 - Detection capabilities
- Discussion and Wrap-up



- **Mobile device capabilities increasing**
 - Approaching functionality of standard PCs
 - Rich application development/delivery
 - iPhone, Android, Maemo, Symbian, WM, etc
- **Enticing target for malware authors**
 - Mobile banking transactions
 - Spying on business/enterprise users
- **Need malware detection/mitigation!**

Current Approach



- Adapt host-based antivirus to mobile devices
 - Numerous vendors have mobile products
- Problems with on-device AV model
 - Detection capabilities vs. resource constraints
 - Scalability protection for future threats
 - Software complexity, platform diversity, AV vulnerabilities

Goal: maintain/increase detection capabilities while reducing resource requirements

New Approach



- Offload detection functionality
 - Instead of analyzing a file locally on-device, send it to a network service for analysis
- Moves complexity and resource usage to off-device service
 - Frees us of resource constraints of mobile device
- Trade-off network bandwidth/radio power to save on-device resources


CloudAV Architecture



Network Service

Separating
acquisition
from analysis

Host Agent



- **Host/mobile agent** runs on desktops, laptops, and mobile devices.
 - Acts similar to host-based AV; interposes on file access
 - Queries network service instead of analyzing locally
- **Network service** hosts the backend AV detection engines and fields file analysis requests from the host agent.

Architecture Components



- Lightweight Mobile Agent
 - Low resource requirements
 - Easy to port to new platforms
 - Simple code base → reduced vuln footprint



- Network Service
 - Can employ multiple detection engine in parallel
 - Central management of AV signature updates
 - More resource intensive and complex detection techniques (eg. behavioral detection engines)

Advantages of Virtualization



- Network service backend
 - Hosts detection engines in virtualized environments
- Scalability
 - Dynamically spin up/down instances
- Isolation/Recovery
 - AV engine vulnerabilities
 - Restore to clean snapshot when compromise detected

Caching, Caching, Caching



- Reducing network activity is desirable
 - Transferring candidate file to network service for analysis on every access is infeasible
- Remote cache
 - Shared between all users of network service
 - Eliminate duplicate file transfer and analysis:
 - Alice runs App1, App1 analyzed; Bob runs App1, remote cache hit!
- Local cache
 - Stored on mobile device
 - Eliminate unnecessary remote cache queries
 - Bob runs App1, remote cache hit; Bob runs App1 again, local cache hit!



- Host Agent
 - Numerous platforms: Win32, BSD, Milter frontends
- Network Service:
 - 10 antivirus engines:
 - Avast, AVG, BitDefender, ClamAV, F-Prot, F-Secure, Kaspersky, McAfee, Symantec, and Trend Micro
 - 2 behavioral engines
 - Norman Sandbox, CWSandbox



- Nokia Maemo platform
 - N770, N800, N810 devices
 - Python, < 300 LOC, Dazuko syscall hooking
- Mobile-specific behavioral engine
 - Runtime behavioral analysis of suspected malware
 - Virtualized Maemo environment
 - Monitors syscalls and D-Bus IPC to detect:
 - Modification/destruction of personal user data
 - Network communications to untrusted parties
 - Skype VoIP calls to unauthorized numbers



- Resource macro-benchmark
 - Nokia N800
 - ClamAV vs. Mobile Agent (MA)
 - Resource consumption (CPU/memory)
- Power consumption micro-benchmark
 - Nokia N95
 - Kaspersky Mobile vs. Mobile Agent (MA)
 - Power consumption of radios (WiFi/EDGE)
- Mobile agent cache states
 - CL+CR, CL+WR, WL+WR

Computational Resources



- Simulated real-world usage benchmark
 - 5 common applications: web browser, IM client, VoIP client, media player, and PDF viewer

Agent	Startup Time	Avg/Peak Memory	User/Total Jiffies
ClamAV	57 sec	25967 KB / 39556 KB	13349 / 15684
MA-CL+CR	0.2 sec	1502 KB / 2154 KB	1502 / 2185
MA-CL+WR	0.2 sec	1486 KB / 2124 KB	1486 / 1854
MA-WL+WR	0.2 sec	1189 KB / 1812 KB	1189 / 1714

Order of magnitude decrease in CPU and memory resources in all mobile agent cache states.

Power Consumption



- Local Kaspersky vs. Mobile Agent
 - Simple scan of ~25M of third-party apps and games

Agent	Avg Energy	Peak Energy	Total Energy
None (Baseline)	0.36 W	0.63 W	43.2 W
Kaspersky	0.86 W	1.27 W	89.4W
MA-CL+CR (EDGE)	1.51 W	2.31 W	250.6 W
MA-CL+CR (WiFi)	1.31 W	2.44 W	165.1 W
MA-CL+WR (EDGE)	1.22 W	2.13 W	126.9 W
MA-CL+WR (WiFi)	0.92 W	1.83 W	74.5 W
MA-WL+WR	0.82 W	1.20 W	59.5 W

Decrease in power consumption in common mobile agent cache states.

Scalability of Detection Capabilities



- Current state of mobile device malware
 - Presently not a large number of threats to protect against
- Host-based AV model
 - Resource/power consumption of on-device software scales with complexity/number of threats

Detection Engine	Signature Database Size
Symantec Mobile	27 signatures
Kaspersky Mobile	284 signatures
ClamAV	262,289 signatures
Cloud AV / Mobile Agent	> 5 million sigs + behavioral

- CloudAV model
 - Resource/power consumption stays static and independent of increase in threats

Detection Coverage




- N-Version Protection
 - The use of multiple detection engines in parallel from independent vendors
- Desktop malware results
 - Subset of malware from Arbor Malware Library

Engine Combination	Detected	Coverage
CM	229/469	48.82%
CM, SM	290/469	61.83%
CM, SM, MA	358/469	76.33%
CM, SM, MA, BD	417/469	88.91%
CM, SM, MA, BD, FS	430/469	91.68%

CM: ClamAV
SM: Symantec
MA: McAfee
BD: BitDefender
FS: F-Secure


- Transparent engine extensibility

Management Capabilities



Web interface:

- Forensics Drilldown
- Policy Enforcement
- Flexible Alerting
- Report Generation



CloudExec
University of Michigan

DASHBOARD
ANALYSIS
ALERTS
ADMIN
DATA

Dashboard

Presets: Last 2 Years

Executions per minute:

Unique executables per minute:

Recent Clients (Total: 66 hosts in 2 group(s)):

GUID	HOST	VERSION	LAST HEARD
927hea5d-3dca-43	cae1695p04_eng	0.3.2	19 seconds ago
1822d70a-5d8e-45	cae1695p45_eng	0.3.2	35 seconds ago
f1a2d715-5d8e-4d	cae1695p36_eng	0.3.2	1 minute ago
5faef8c0-a985-4e	cae1695p09_eng	0.3.2	1 minute ago
8ecd35d-d919-4b	cae1695p03_eng	0.3.2	1 minute ago
02d46026-cb66-4d	cae1695p01_eng	0.3.2	1 minute ago
283d985b-4736-45	loadtestp09_dc	0.3.1	1 minute ago
7a7c353e-c07f-42	cae1695p10_eng	0.3.2	1 minute ago

[more...](#)

Top Files:

COUNT	FILE	SIZE
86331	net.exe	41.0 KB
73535	verclsid.exe	28.0 KB
57179	cmd.exe	379.0 KB
31007	net1.exe	122.0 KB
29557	rundll32.exe	32.0 KB
29523	regedit.exe	143.0 KB
18193	regsvr32.exe	11.0 KB
15568	TINTSETP.EXE	444.0 KB
15504	firefox.exe	7.0 MB

[more...](#)

Suspicious Files:

SHA1	RESULTS
4a0567320ba3c74e2b92c249f30725a8577b2ac	✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓
113ae7843571b88e9c112b31621a6047e8069502	✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓
11cF5d4F497Aed74F3a7e951704b33ae65FFb01098	✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓

Recent Alerts:

TIME	GUID	FILENAME
Sat Dec 22 07:38:08 2007	1fafbcb-4982-48	calc.exe
Fri Dec 21 02:03:13 2007	02d46026-cb66-4d	calc.exe
Wed Dec 19 22:31:18 2007	7a7c353e-c07f-42	calc.exe

VM Monitoring:

- Real-time System Status
- Xen VM Management
- Visualization Eye-Candy!



- **Disconnected operation**
 - Local caching mechanisms
 - Limited app/content acquisition while disconnected
 - Security policy decision
- **Privacy concerns**
 - Tunable collection/display built into architecture
 - User awareness of operation



Questions?

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