The Stack is Back

Jon Oberheide
The heap sucks
Heap vs. stack

Excerpt from “Objective quantitative scientific comparison of the heap and stack” by Dr. Jono, PhD from the journal of Useless Computer Science:

- **Heap:**
  - Complicated
  - Requires skillz
  - Bad connotation: “heap of trash”
  - The 1%, elitist, pro-life, racist

- **Stack:**
  - Easy
  - Doesn't
  - Good connotation: “stack of bills”
  - Saves kittens from burning buildings
Bringing the stack back

- What's left to exploit with the stack?

- Smashing?
- ROP'ing?
- Jacking?

- Let's exploit stack overflows!
The stack is back

• A brief history of stack overflows
• Stack overflows in the Linux kernel
• Exploiting exotic stack overflows
• Discovering and mitigating stack overflows
Fake stack overflows

NO!
THIS IS A STACK-BASED BUFFER OVERFLOW
Real stack overflows

- **Start of stack**
- **High address**
- **End of stack**
- **Low address**
- **Stack pointer**
- **Grows down**

The diagram illustrates a stack with a pointer indicating the start and end addresses. The stack grows down, with the stack pointer moving towards the high address.
Stack overflows

- Stack overflows
  - Misuse of terminology
  - Jono's definition:

  Stack pointer decremented beyond the intended bounds of the stack's allocated VMA.

- Types of overflows
  - Incremental overflows
  - Allocation overflows
Incremental overflows

- Incremental overflows
- Deep call chains
- Recursion

```c
void func() {
    func();
}
```
Allocation overflows

- Large local stack vars
- Dynamic allocations: VLAs, alloca(3)
Exploiting stack overflows

• Stack overflows in userspace
  • Not uncommon
  • Lots of controllable (and uncontrollable) recursion
  • Some use of C99 VLAs and alloca(3)

• \textit{Exploitable} stack overflows
  • Exploitable = more than DoS
  • Quite rare!
Trivia #1

What is one scenario where a userspace stack overflow might be exploitable?
Large memory management vulnerabilities

System, compiler, and application issues

Gaël Delalleau
gael.delalleau@beijaflore.com
gael.delalleau+csw@m4x.org

Security consultant from

http://www.beijaflore.com
Stack overlap

Linux 2.6

- ELF mapping: code segment [r-x]
- ELF mapping: data segment [rwx]
- "top down" mmap area [fragmented]
- Heap growing up [fragmented]
- Stack growing down [continuum]

Lower limit of the stack (default 128 M)

Stack growth needed by application

%esp lies in heap mapping
(for purists: the stack and heap VMAs don't overlap)
Real-world stack overflows

- Xorg large MM vuln by Rafal @ ITL
  - No guard page at end of stack on <= Linux 2.6.36
  - Allocate large pixmaps to exhaust address space
  - Force a shm allocation adjacent to the stack
  - Call recursive function to cause stack/shm overlap
  - Write to the shm and therefore the Xorg stack
Embedded platforms

Limited memory $\rightarrow$ limited stack $\rightarrow$ stack overflows
Remote kernel overflows?

- BSD IPComp kernel stack overflow
  - Travis Normandy
  - Recursive decompression in IP stack

- Exploitable?
  - Ehhhh...
The stack is back

- A brief history of stack overflows
- Stack overflows in the Linux kernel
- Exploiting exotic stack overflows
- Discovering and mitigating stack overflows
Linux kernel stacks

- Each userspace thread is allocated a kernel stack
- Stores stack frames for kernel syscalls and other metadata
- Most commonly 8k, some distros use 4k
  - `THREAD_SIZE = 2*PAGE_SIZE = 2*4086 = 8192`
struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct *task;
    struct exec_domain *exec_domain;
    __u32 flags;
    __u32 status;
    __u32 cpu;
    int preempt_count;
    mm_segment_t addr_limit;
    struct restart_block restart_block;
    void __user *sysenter_return;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
    unsigned long previous_esp;
    __u8 supervisor_stack;
#endif
    int uaccess_err;
};

thread_info struct is at the base of kstack!
Exploiting stack overflows

If we control an incremental or allocation stack overflow in the Linux kernel, we can cause our thread's kernel stack to collide with the thread_info structure.
Targeting thread_info

• What would the overflow collide with?
  • uaccess_err
    • No security impact, but safe to clobber
  • restart_block
    • A function pointer, BINGO!
  • addr_limit
    • Define u/k boundary, BONGO!
  • preempt_count .. task_struct
    • Pretty sensitive members, avoid clobbering

struct restart_block {
  long (*fn)(struct restart_block *);
  union {} /* safe to clobber */
};

access_ok()/__range_not_ok():
Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
addr + size > addr_limit.seg
Controlling the clobberer

• Can we control the clobbering value?
  • Incremental overflow: tip of the stack, unlikely
  • Allocation overflow: VLA values, maybe

• Good news, don't need *much* control!

• Two categories:
  • Value represents a kernel space address
    • Value $> \text{TASK\_SIZE}$
  • Value represents a user space address
    • Value $< \text{TASK\_SIZE}$
Clobber → Code Exec

- If value < TASK_SIZE
  - Clobber restart_block fptrer with userspace value
  - mmap privesc payload at that address in userspace
  - Trigger fptrer via syscall(SYS_restart_syscall);

- If value > TASK_SIZE
  - Clobber addr_limit with a high kernel space value
  - You can now pass copy_from_user() / access_ok() checks up to that kernel address
  - So we can read(2) from a fd and write into kmem
Vanilla exploitation

We consider these “vanilla” stack overflows.

- **thread_info clobbering technique**
  - Will work in the common case for Linux kernel stack overflows

- **Example vuln @ CSAW CTF**
  - Controlled recursion with userspace value at tip of the stack

Architecture specifics

- **x86_64**
  - Pretty clean, dedicated interrupt stacks

- **x86_32**
  - Interrupt stack shared with process stack
  - Less predictability, but more opportunity to trigger a stack overflow

- **ARM, alpha, others**
  - restart_block is on end of thread_info :-}
The stack is back

- A brief history of stack overflows
- Stack overflows in the Linux kernel
- Exploiting exotic stack overflows
- Discovering and mitigating stack overflows
Let's look at a real-world Linux kernel stack overflow vulnerability.

- Two great bugs from Nelson
  - CVE-2010-3848
  - CVE-2010-3850
  - And a bonus bug that will come into play later

- Econet packet family
  - Stack overflow in econet_sendmsg()
Vulnerable code

```
int econet_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
    ...
    struct iovec iov[msg->msg_iovlen+1];

    for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) {
        ...
        iov[i+1].iov_base = base;
        iov[i+1].iov_len = iov_len;
        ...
    }
```

Oh snap! A VLA on the stack with an attacker controlled length!

```
Hey, we (mostly) control the contents too! Game over, eh?
```
Attempt #1

- Expand VLA to hit thread_info directly
- Overwrite restart_block/addr_limit with attacker controlled values

Thwarted!

- Subsequent function calls in sendmsg will clobber sensitive thread_info members
Attempt #2

- Attempt #2
  - Expand VLA to just above thread_info
  - Overwrite using the stack frames of subsequent calls (sock_sendmsg)

Semi-thwarted!

- Overwrite value is uncontrolled and a kernel space value so restart_block is no good
- What about addr_limit?
Attempt #2 continued

- We can hit addr_limit with a value that represents a high kernel space value
  - Overwrite of addr_limit occurs in sock_sendmsg call

```c
oldfs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_sendmsg(udpsock, &udpmsg, size);
set_fs(oldfs);
```

- You can't be serious...
  - addr_limit is being saved/restored before/after the sock_sendmsg call, nullifying our overwrite
Attempt #2 continued

- We could try other subsequent function calls besides sock_sendmsg
  - Cause error condition, return from econet_sendmsg early with a terminating mutex_unlock call. Eg:
    ```c
    if (len + 15 > dev->mtu) {
      mutex_unlock(&econet_mutex);
      return -EMSGSIZE;
    }
    ```

- Write offsets of the stack frame don't align
  - Pattern: chunks of two 8-byte writes w/kernel value
  - Hit restart_block with kernel value (useless) or hit both addr_limit (good) and preempt_count (crash)
Attempt #3

- Blow past thread_info and with VLA and “write-back” towards the end of the kernel stack
- Overwrite task_struct with an attacker-controlled address

Ok, this is just insane...

- Yes, you can make a fake task_struct in userspace, but not in this century

```c
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, base, iov_len)) {
    mutex_unlock(&econet_mutex);
    return -EFAULT;
}
```
Need a different approach

It's clear the thread_info technique is not going to work here due to extenuating circumstances

• If thread_info is out, what can we do?
• Nothing useful on the stack, but...
• Need some audience help here...
Any ideas of what to do if the thread_info technique isn't going to work?
Beyond our stack

- A thread's kstack doesn't exist in a vacuum
- Each kstack allocated from the buddy allocator

- Screw *intra-stack* exploitation, let's talk *inter-stack* exploitation
Attacking adjacent kstacks

In an allocation-based overflow, we can blow past the end of our stack and into an adjacent stack!

- Two big questions:
  - How do we get two thread kernel stacks allocated adjacently?
  - How do we sanely modify another thread's stack to gain code exec?

We sort of did this with stackjacking self-discovery!

We sort of did this with stackjacking Obergrope!
Kernel stack disclosures

1) process makes syscall and leaves sensitive data on kstack

2) kstack is reused on subsequent syscall and struct overlaps with sensitive data

3) foo struct is copied to userspace, leaking 4 bytes of kstack through uninitialized foo.leak member

```
struct foo {  
    uint32_t bar;  
    uint32_t leak;  
    uint32_t baz;  
};

syscall() {
    struct foo;
    foo.bar = 1;
    foo.baz = 2;
    copy_to_user(foo);
}
```
Kernel stack self-discovery

• If we can leak an pointer to the kstack off the kstack, we can calculate the base address of the kstack

```
kstack_base = addr & ~(THREAD_SIZE – 1);
kstack_base = 0xcdef1234 & ~(8192 – 1)
kstack_base = 0xcdef0000
```

We call this **kstack self-discovery**
Writing the adjacent kstack

- Getting adjacent kstacks
  - Spawn children, have them self-discover their kstack address, spin until we get two adjacent allocations

- Writing the adjacent stack
  - Process #2 kstack needs to be in a stable predictable state
  - Process #1 needs a sufficient landing zone to absorb mutex_unlock stack frame
Sleepy syscalls are back

• Process #2 will enter a “sleepy syscall”
  • Arbitrary sleeping to avoid dangerous race conditions with the overflow write
  • While asleep, process #1 will overwrite a return address on process #2's kstack

• compat_sys_wait4 looks good
  • Hey, same function we used for stackjacking!
  • Large unused local stack vars to absorb the mutex_unlock stack frame
Final exploit flow

- Achieve adjacent kstacks
- Process #2 goes to sleep
- Stack overflow in process #1
- Overwrite return address on process #2 kernel stack
- Process #2 wakes up
- Process #2 returns to attacker control address
- Privilege escalation payload executed!
DEMO TIME?

http://jon.oberheide.org/files/half-nelson.c
The stack is back

- A brief history of stack overflows
- Stack overflows in the Linux kernel
- Exploiting exotic stack overflows
- Discovering and mitigating stack overflows
What is one way to discover potential stack overflow vulnerabilities?
jono discovery method

Ghetto kstack overflow discovery mechanism:

Advanced l33t static analysis:

```
egrep -R "^[[:space:]]*(struct |char | (u)?int(8_t|16_t|32_t|64_t)? |void )[^=]+\[a-z]+.*\[\+\*].*\];" * |
grep -v sizeof
```

Projected to win gruggq's #grep2pwn 2012.
pipacs discovery method

The proper way to do it: gcc plugin

13:27 < pipacs> jono btw, i'm sorry to burst your infiltrate bubble but the next stackleak plugin will fix the alloca problems...

13:28 < pipacs> (and if you want to find all those bugs, the same plugin can tell you exactly where they occur ;)

pax_check_alloca verifies kstack sanity after alloca calls.

Inserted at compile time by stackleak_check_alloca into any functions that use __builtin_alloca.

See tools/gcc/stackleak_plugin.c in latest PaX patch
Exploiting hardened kernels

- On grsec/PaX kernels, thread_info is no longer stored at the base of the kernel stack
  - Mitigated the Rosengrope stackjacking method
  - So, the standard thread_info overwrite is ineffective

Can we use the adjacent process exploitation technique against hardened kernels?

- Yes...
  - But RANDKSTACK makes it hard and new STACKLEAK plugin makes it near infeasible
Mitigating exploitation

- Move thread_info off the stack!
  - Thwarts vanilla thread_info exploitation technique
  - Patches years ago to LKML, rejected by mainline
- Thwarting the adjacent process technique is a bit harder
  - Something like PaX's RANDKSTACK would make things harder
Wrap-up

- **GIVE UP HEAPSTERS!**
  - Win8 fixed everything, the heap is over
- **Stack overflows are exploitable**
  - At least in the Linux kernel
  - How about your favorite OS? Windows/BSD/etc?
- **Don't shun “unexploitable” vuln classes**
  - Other situations? Userspace via browser/js?
Greetz

- #busticati
- $1$kk1q85Xp$Id.gAcJ0g7uelf36VQwJQ/
- ;PpPppPpPpPPPPpP
QUESTIONS?

Jon Oberheide
jon@oberheide.org
Duo Security